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Plaintiffs J Thompson and William P. Duncanson (“plaintiffs”) hereby bring 
this action for damages and other relief against defendants 1-800 Contacts, Inc. (“1-
800 Contacts” or the “Company”), Vision Direct, Inc. (“VisionDirect”) and Does 1-15 
(collectively “defendants”) for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. 
§§1-3), and California’s Cartwright Act (California Business & Professions Code 
§16700, et seq.) and Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§17200, et seq.).  Plaintiffs make all allegations upon information and belief except as 
to those paragraphs that are based on plaintiffs’ personal knowledge. 
THE CONSPIRACY 
1. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of all direct-to-consumer purchasers 
of contact lenses, including those who purchased contact lenses online, in the United 
States and a subclass of all California residents against defendant 1-800 Contacts as 
the ringleader behind a scheme to prevent competition in the online market for contact 
lenses and against 1-800 Contacts’ currently unnamed co-conspirators, Does 1-15.  
This action arises out of defendants’ overarching scheme to restrain competition in the 
direct-to-consumer and online markets for contact lenses. 
2. As recently revealed in a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”), 1-800 Contacts is the instigator and enforcer of an unlawful series of 
agreements between 1-800 Contacts and at least 14 of its “competitors” to divide up 
the direct-to-consumer and online markets for sales of contact lenses.  These 15 
“competitors” combine to control over 50% of the direct-to-consumer and online 
markets for contact lenses.  1-800 Contacts accounts for over 50% of the online 
market by itself.  In particular, 1-800 Contacts abused its monopoly power and entered 
into bilateral agreements with each of its competitors/co-conspirators to not bid 
against each other in advertising auctions conducted by internet search engines. 
3. Due to the massive amount of information available on the internet, 
internet search engines have become indispensable to anyone seeking to use the 
internet.  Internet search engines are generally simple to use – a user need only enter 
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keywords, such as “contact lenses,” into a field and the search engine will use an 
algorithm to find and list the webpages that are responsive to the query, usually 
ranked in order of relevance.  Search engines, such as Google or Bing, are usually free 
to users.  The main source of revenue for these search engines is the advertising they 
sell, which appears in response to a user’s search and is displayed adjacent to the 
respective search engine’s organic results.  This form of advertising has a proven track 
record of being successful, as it allows the advertisers to market directly to consumers 
at the very moment they are looking to make a purchase or have expressed an interest 
in a specific subject.  Online search engine advertising is critical to nearly every 
company’s ability to compete in the digital age.  Google and Bing sell this advertising 
through automated auctions. 
4. A successful way for competitors to raise awareness of their products and 
compete for sales is to purchase search advertising that mentions their competitors, 
especially as a comparison.  For example, if a consumer is looking to buy a television 
for the cheapest price and knows a big retailer like Best Buy sells televisions, the 
consumer might search for “cheaper than best buy for tvs.”  Such a search will likely 
yield sponsored ads by Best Buy, but also ads by competitors, such as Walmart. 
5. This is not the case in the contact lenses industry.  A search of “cheaper 
than 1-800 contacts for contact lenses” yields sponsored advertising by only one 
company, 1-800 Contacts.  The reason for this disparity is that anticompetitive 
bilateral agreements between 1-800 Contacts and its co-conspirators prevent each 
other from bidding on any search keywords or phrases with the other company’s 
brand names, websites or trademarks in them.  In addition, the agreements require that 
1-800 Contacts and its co-conspirators use “negative keywords.”  This is an 
instruction to the search provider that a company’s advertisement should not appear in 
response to a search query that contains a particular term or terms.  Normally negative 
keywords are used to prevent advertising appearing from irrelevant queries that may 
contain similar words.  For example, a company that sells billiards accessories would 
Case 3:16-cv-02552-LAB-KSC   Document 1   Filed 10/13/16   Page 3 of 37
   - 3 -
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
bid for the term “pool” in order to advertise for pool sticks, but use a negative 
keyword of “swimming” to prevent its ads from appearing when someone is looking 
for water-related accessories.  While many companies use negative keywords to 
properly tailor advertisements to interested consumers, defendants use negative 
keywords to allocate the market for contact lenses.  1-800 Contacts and its co-
conspirators agreed to instruct search advertisers that their advertising should not 
appear when a search includes a competitor’s trademark through the use of negative 
keywords. 
6. The 1-800 Contacts-led scheme has been ongoing for more than a 
decade.  In 2003, there was an estimated $200 million worth of online contact lens 
sales.  Though 1-800 Contacts accounted for $187 million worth of those sales, the 
Company realized that it was beginning to have real competition for direct sales.  1-
800 Contacts thereafter devised a plan to unlawfully stifle online competitors so that it 
could continue to sell contact lenses at higher prices than its rivals without losing 
market share.  Specifically, in order to restrict competition and maintain its market 
share and pricing, 1-800 Contacts began accusing its then competitors of trademark 
infringement if a rival’s advertisement appeared on the search results page in response 
to internet search queries that involved 1-800 Contacts’ brand name, websites or 
trademarks.  1-800 Contacts’ position was legally baseless and a transparent threat to 
inundate its competitors with prolonged and costly litigation. 
7. Between 2004 and 2013, fourteen of 1-800 Contacts’ competitors agreed 
with 1-800 Contacts not to bid against 1-800 Contacts in certain auctions in order to 
settle the sham lawsuits or threat thereof.  Most of the competitors agreed to 1-800 
Contacts’ terms before even asserting counter claims.  The agreements – which are 
reciprocal – prevented 1-800 Contacts and its competitors from bidding in search 
advertising auctions for any of the others’ trademarked terms and common variations, 
including common misspellings, of any of those terms.  Each competitor knew that by 
entering into this agreement, its market share and profits would be protected.  Of 
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course, to ensure this was the case, all a competitor needed to do was a Google search.  
In addition, 13 of the agreements called for the adoption of negative keywords.  Only 
one competitor, Lens.com, refused to enter into an agreement.  1-800 Contacts and 
Lens.com proceeded to litigate 1-800 Contacts’ bogus trademark claim, and after 
years of litigation, Lens.com prevailed.  The district court in that action specifically 
called the practice of seeking agreements that preclude a competitor’s advertisements 
from appearing on a search results page any time its mark is entered as a search term 
“an anti-competitive, monopolistic protection to which [1-800 Contacts] is not 
entitled.”1  Notably, in its answer to the FTC action, 1-800 Contacts admitted that it 
entered into these agreements with competitors in all but one case to allegedly resolve 
threatened or actual trademark litigation. 
8. Members of the Class and the California Subclass (as defined herein) 
were injured by defendants’ actions.  First, the members of the Class and California 
Subclass paid supracompetitive prices for contact lenses.  Indeed, the impetus for 1-
800 Contacts’ scheme was to suppress competition to protect the margins the 
Company traditionally enjoyed before competition entered the marketplace. 
9. In addition, defendants’ actions prevented the Class and California 
Subclass from receiving the benefits of a fair and competitive marketplace for both 
information and pricing of contact lenses sold directly to consumers, including online.  
Because of the unlawful agreements, competitors could not advertise against 1-800 
Contacts, and therefore customers did not receive information concerning 
competitors’ products and pricing.  Because of these agreements, 1-800 Contacts 
continued to give the impression that it was a low-cost provider of contact lenses, 
shielding the public from information that would have driven the price of contact 
lenses down. 
                                           1 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1151, 1174 (D. Utah 2010), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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10. Thus far, defendants’ scheme has worked, at least for 1-800 Contacts.  
1-800 Contacts was able to carve up the direct-to-consumer market for contact lens 
sales and prevent the dissemination of its competitors’ advertisements, allowing it to 
continue to sell contact lenses at supracompetitive prices.  During the relevant time 
period, 1-800 Contacts has consistently been the highest priced seller of the most 
popular contact lenses.  Despite charging more (in some cases substantially more) 
than its competitors, 1-800 Contacts has retained its dominant market position.  In a 
competitive marketplace, absent 1-800 Contacts’ action and its competitors’ 
agreement to the scheme, accurate and fulsome information would have driven prices 
down. 
VENUE AND JURISDICTION 
11. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(d) 
and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §1711, et seq., which 
vests original jurisdiction in the district courts of the United States for any multi-state 
class action where the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and where 
the citizenship of any members of the class of plaintiffs is different from that of any 
defendant.  The $5 million amount in controversy and diverse-citizenship 
requirements of CAFA are satisfied in this case. 
12. The Court has personal jurisdiction over each of the defendants because, 
inter alia, each of the defendants: (a) transacted business throughout the United States, 
including in this District; (b) sold billions of dollars in and provided services related to 
contact lenses throughout the United States, including in this District; (c) had 
substantial contacts with the United States, including in this District; and/or (d) was 
engaged in an illegal conspiracy that was directed at and had the intended effect of 
causing injury to persons residing in, located in, or doing business throughout the 
United States, including in this District. 
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13. Defendants engaged in conduct inside the United States that caused 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable and intended anticompetitive effects 
upon interstate commerce within the United States. 
14. The activities of defendant 1-800 Contacts and its co-conspirators were 
within the flow of, were intended to, and did have, a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce of the United States.  Defendants’ products and services are sold in the 
flow of interstate commerce. 
15. The anticompetitive conduct, and its effects on U.S. commerce described 
herein, proximately caused antitrust injury to plaintiffs and members of the Class and 
the California Subclass in the United States. 
16. By reason of the unlawful activities alleged herein, defendants 
substantially affected commerce throughout the United States, causing injury to 
plaintiffs and members of the Class. 
17. Defendants’ conspiracy and wrongdoing described herein adversely 
affected persons in the United States, including plaintiffs and members of the Class 
and the California Subclass. 
18. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to §12 of the Clayton Act (15 
U.S.C. §22) and 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)-(d), because a substantial part of the events 
giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District, a substantial portion of the 
affected interstate trade and commerce discussed herein has been carried out in this 
District, and one or more of the defendants resides in, is licensed to do business in, is 
doing business in, had agents in, or is found or transacts business in, this District. 
PARTIES 
19. During the Class Period (as defined below), plaintiff J Thompson 
(“Thompson”) purchased contact lenses directly from 1-800 Contacts through its 
website.  Plaintiff Thompson purchased these lenses at supracompetitive prices, and 
was injured thereby.  Plaintiff Thompson is a resident of San Diego, California. 
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20. During the Class Period, plaintiff William P. Duncanson (“Duncanson”) 
purchased contact lenses directly from 1-800 Contacts through its website.  Plaintiff 
Duncanson purchased these lenses at supracompetitive prices, and was injured 
thereby.  Plaintiff Duncanson is a resident of San Francisco, California. 
21. Defendant 1-800 Contacts is a corporation organized, existing, and doing 
business under and by virtue of the laws of the United States, with its principal place 
of business located at 261 West Data Drive, Draper, Utah 84020.  1-800 Contacts sells 
contact lenses and related products over the internet and by telephone throughout the 
United States, including to California residents. 
22. Defendant VisionDirect is a leading online retailer of contact lenses and 
vision care supplies.  The Bellevue, Washington-based company offers a full line of 
bestselling products like Acuvue®, Bausch & Lomb®, CIBA Vision®, and 
CooperVision®, plus specialty brands and lenses.  VisionDirect was founded in 2000 
and has since shipped over 8 million orders.  In 2003, VisionDirect was acquired by 
drugstore.com®, and in 2011, it became part of the Walgreens group of companies. 
23. The true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as Does 1 
through 15, inclusive (“Doe Defendants”), are presently not known to plaintiffs, who 
therefore sue these defendants by such fictitious names.  Plaintiffs will seek to amend 
this complaint and include these Doe Defendants’ true names and capacities when 
they are ascertained.  Each of the fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some 
manner for the conduct alleged herein and for the injuries suffered by the Class and 
California Subclass. 
THE MARKET FOR CONTACT LENSES 
The Relevant Markets 
24. Plaintiffs first plead a relevant market for antitrust purposes as the market 
for direct-to-consumer sales of contact lenses.  This includes both online and 
telephone sales of contact lenses to consumers (“direct-to-consumer”).  Because of the 
ease of purchasing contacts without going to a physical store, the traditional retail 
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market for contacts exists separately, and is not a substitute for online and telephone 
sales.  A small but significant increase in the price for online contacts would not drive 
consumers to purchase contacts in a retail store.  Alternatively, the relevant market for 
antitrust purposes is only online sales.  Discovery and expert testimony may reveal 
that online sales and telephone sales are not close economic substitutes.  As detailed 
below, the traditional retail sale of contact lenses exists in a different market.  The 
relevant geographic market is the United States.  Regardless of whether the market is 
defined as direct-to-consumer or online sales only, 1-800 Contacts has a significant 
enough market share to exert market power. 
25. A contact lens is a lightweight, corrective, cosmetic or therapeutic device 
that is usually placed directly onto the cornea of the eye.  Contact lenses have many 
benefits for wearers, including appearance and practicality. 
26. Contact lenses are considered medical devices by the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (the “FDA”).  Accordingly, the FDA regulates the 
manufacture, distribution and sale of contact lenses in the United States. 
27. In addition, in 2003, Congress enacted the Fairness to Contact Lens 
Consumers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§7601-7610.  Pursuant to this act, the FTC promulgated 
rules concerning the sale of contact lenses with the intention of increasing competition 
for the sale of contact lenses (the “Contact Lens Rule”).  The Contact Lens Rule 
places certain restrictions on how contact lenses can be sold.  Most notably, the 
Contact Lens Rule requires sellers to only sell to customers who have a valid 
prescription and can confirm the accuracy of the prescription. 
28. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that there 
are approximately 40.9 million contact lens wearers in the United States aged eighteen 
years and older, or approximately 16.7% of the adult population. 
29. The markets for direct-to-consumer and online sales of contact lenses are 
distinct from the traditional brick and mortar market.  Direct-to-consumer contact lens 
sellers are able to sell contact lenses anywhere in the United States that receives mail.  
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Online contact lens sellers provide the consumer the convenience of being able to 
order contacts from any location without having to find a brick and mortar store 
selling their needed type of contact lenses.  According to data from Bain Capital 
regarding the future of independent optometry, in 2012 an estimated 20% of contact 
lens sales occurred online.  That number has since increased. 
30. In contrast to direct-to-consumer sales of contacts, retailers in the 
traditional market operate from physical storefronts or professional offices, maintain 
an eye-care professional on-site to examine and fit their customers, and issue contact 
lens prescriptions.  Traditional retailers do not set their prices based upon direct-to-
consumer prices.  According to an economist with the FTC who examined online and 
offline prices for contact lenses, “[O]ffline firms set prices on the assumption that 
most of their customers are unaware of online prices.” See James C. Cooper, Prices 
and Price Dispersion in Online and Offline Markets for Contact Lenses, FTC Bureau 
of Economics Working Paper (Nov. 29, 2006). 
The Demand for Contact Lenses Is Inelastic  
31. “Elasticity” is a term used to describe the sensitivity of supply and 
demand to changes in one or the other.  For example, demand is said to be “elastic” if 
an increase in the price of a product results in diminished revenues, with declines in 
the quantity sold of that product outweighing the effects of higher prices.  For 
products with a highly elastic demand, customers have many feasible alternatives for 
cheaper products of similar quality and decrease purchases sharply in the face of even 
a small price increase.  Here, the demand for contact lenses is inelastic. 
32. Markets with lower elasticity facilitate collusion, allowing producers to 
raise their prices without triggering customer substitution and sufficient lost sales 
revenues as to offset the beneficial effect of higher prices on profits for products they 
still continue to sell. 
33. There is only one other medical device that provides some of the same 
benefits as contact lenses – eyeglasses.  Many people choose to wear contact lenses as 
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opposed to eyeglasses because they do not steam up, they provide a wider field of 
vision, and they are more suitable for a number of sporting activities.  In addition, 
some people find wearing contact lenses more aesthetically pleasing than eyeglasses.  
Contact lenses also have the ability to alter the color of a user’s eye and can be used 
solely for cosmetic purposes.  Contact lens manufacturers, distributors, online sellers, 
brick and mortar retailers and consumers do not compare the price of contact lenses to 
those of glasses. 
34. Contact lenses have a limited lifespan, and therefore a contact lens user 
will have to periodically purchase more contact lenses.  Contact lens users will 
purchase contact lenses that are good for a set amount of time and buy a certain supply 
of the contact lens.  Usually, the contact lens users’ eye-care providers will decide the 
type of contact used, the strength of the contact, and whether a contact lens has to be 
replaced daily, weekly or monthly.  Therefore, consumers exert little choice in the 
particular type of contact lens they will buy.  As a result, contact lens purchasers will 
continue to use and acquire contact lenses even if there is an increase in price. 
The Markets for Direct-to-Consumer and Online 
Contact Lens Sales Are Highly Concentrated 
35. 1-800 Contacts has dominated the market for direct-to-consumer sales of 
contact lenses since it was founded in 1995. 
36. In 1999, orders of contact lenses in the direct-to-consumer market, as 
opposed to the brick-and-mortar or traditional market, began to shift from over-the-
phone sales to sales through online channels. 
37. Since then, sales of contact lenses through the internet have increased due 
to the ease and convenience of ordering contacts online, among other factors.  For 
instance, a contact lens user can order new contact lenses online, even if they have 
recently moved and have yet to find a new eye-care provider.  Indeed, this is the exact 
scenario that happened to plaintiff Thompson, which led to his first purchases from 1-
800 Contacts. 
Case 3:16-cv-02552-LAB-KSC   Document 1   Filed 10/13/16   Page 11 of 37
   - 11 -
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
38. 1-800 Contacts is by far the most dominant company in direct-to-
consumer and online contact lens sales, accounting for between 50%-55% of the 
market since 2005.  Collectively, 1-800 Contacts and the fourteen companies that it 
entered into the illegal bilateral agreements with account for over 80% of the market 
for online contact lens sales. 
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT BY THE DEFENDANTS 
39. Defendants are horizontal competitors. 
40. The conspiracy consisted of a continuing agreement, understanding or 
concerted action between and among defendants and their co-conspirators in 
furtherance of which defendants fixed, maintained or made artificial prices for contact 
lenses sold directly to consumers, including online, in the United States and to 
California residents by rigging search engine advertising auctions and preventing the 
dissemination of information to the Class and California Subclass during the Class 
Period.  Defendants’ conspiracy constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act and the Cartwright Act and is an unreasonable and unlawful restraint of trade and 
an unlawful, unfair or fraudulent practice under the UCL. 
41. At all relevant times, other corporations, individuals and entities willingly 
conspired with defendants in their unlawful and illegal conduct. Numerous individuals 
and entities participated actively during the course and in furtherance of the scheme 
described herein. The individuals and entities acted in concert by joint ventures and by 
acting as agents for principals in order to advance the objectives of the scheme to 
benefit defendants and themselves through the manipulation of contact lens prices in 
the United States and sold to California residents. 
Online Advertising and Sale of Contact Lenses 
42. Contact lens retailers such as 1-800 Contacts rely heavily on internet 
advertising to attract and inform consumers about their products and to direct 
consumers to their websites and phone representatives.  The vast majority of this 
advertising is done through internet search engines such as Google and Yahoo!.  
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Internet search engines are computer programs that allow web users to search the 
World Wide Web for websites containing particular content.  When a search term is 
entered, the search engine compares the term against its databases and applies a 
formula or algorithm to produce a search engine results page that lists the websites 
that may relate to the user’s search terms.  Google’s search engine, for example, has a 
natural or organic system that lists results with the most relevant websites appearing 
near the top of the page.  In addition, search results pages list paid advertisements 
above or to the right of the organic search results.  These paid advertisements are 
referred to as “sponsored links.”  Consumers depend on search engines to navigate the 
nearly unlimited amount of content on the internet. 
43. Search engine companies sell advertising space on search engine results 
pages by way of auction.  Advertisers bid on certain words or phrases known as 
“keywords.”  When a user’s search term matches an advertiser’s keyword, a 
sponsored link appears for that advertiser.  The order and location of the sponsored 
link depends on the amount bid for the keyword and the quality of the advertisement.  
According to the terms and conditions of the search engine companies, advertisers 
cannot pay to be listed in a specific order on the search engine results page, they can 
only pay for advertisements. 
44. When bidding on a keyword, an advertiser may specify whether 
keywords should be applied as a “broad match,” “phrase match,” “exact match,” or 
“negative match.”  When an advertiser designates a keyword as a “broad match,” its 
sponsored link will appear anytime a search is conducted for that keyword, its plural 
forms, its synonyms, or phrases similar to the word.  When an advertiser designates a 
keyword as a “phrase match,” its sponsored link will appear when a user searches for 
a particular phrase, even if the user includes other terms before or after the phrase.  
When an advertiser designates a keyword as an “exact match,” then its sponsored link 
will appear only when the exact phrase bid on is searched on Google.  In contrast, 
when an advertiser designates a keyword as a “negative match,” the advertiser ensures 
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that its link will not appear when certain terms are searched.  For example, a contact 
lens seller may specify that its link should not appear when the phrase “contact lists” 
is entered. 
45. Defendants pay for advertisements on a “cost-per-click” basis. This 
means if a keyword generates a sponsored link, but the internet user does not click on 
that link, the advertiser does not pay for its link appearing on the search results page.  
The appearance of an advertiser’s link on a user’s computer is called an “impression.”  
An advertiser selects the language used in its advertisements. The language can be 
important in capturing a user’s attention so the user will click on the link to an 
advertiser’s website.  An advertiser can gauge the success of an impression (and the 
search terms that led to that impression) by calculating how many impressions occur 
in comparison to the number of clicks. 
46. Search advertising is crucial to advertisers because it allows them to 
deliver a message to the consumer exactly when the consumer is expressing interest in 
a specific subject and potentially at the same time the consumer is ready to make a 
purchase.  In the online contact lens market, consumers rarely have preference over 
which particular retailer they make their purchase from.  Instead, consumers most 
frequently use generic search terms such as contact, contact lens and replaceable lens, 
and purchase based on the lowest price available for their prescription. 
1-800 Contacts’ Scheme to Restrain Competition 
and Maintain Its Dominant Market Position 
47. 1-800 Contacts was founded in February 1995 as 1-800-LENSNOW, but 
changed its name to 1-800 Contacts in July 1995.  Within one month of changing its 
name, 1-800 Contacts received 2,000 calls and produced $38,000 in revenue.  1-800 
Contacts’ business grew rapidly over the next few years, as it became the most 
dominant company in direct-to-consumer contact lens sales, including online sales. 
48. By the early 2000s, however, competitors began to enter the direct-to-
consumer market for the sale of contact lenses.  These competitors, like VisionDirect, 
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heavily invested in online search advertising and undercut 1-800 Contacts’ prices.  
Through lower prices, these competitors quickly grew their sales and became a serious 
threat to 1-800 Contacts’ dominant market position. 
49. This sparked concern at 1-800 Contacts.  In 2005, as Americans’ comfort 
with the internet and online shopping increased, in an effort to deter its competitors 
and reduce competition, 1-800 Contacts implemented a business practice whereby it 
conducted periodic online searches of “1-800 Contacts” and variations thereof on 
internet search engines.  Anytime its searches returned the sponsored link of a 
competitor, 1-800 Contacts would send a cease-and-desist letter to the competitor that 
accused the competitor of infringing upon its trademark by purchasing a keyword 
using 1-800 Contacts’ name from the internet search engine.  But this claim was 
incorrect. 
50. 1-800 Contacts understood that it had no legal basis for these accusations.  
1-800 Contacts knew that an internet search for “1-800 Contacts” would return a list 
of links from various retailers that had acquired generic, non-infringing search terms 
such as “contact” and “contact lens.” 
51. Before sending the cease-and-desist letters, 1-800 Contacts did not 
confirm that its competitors had purchased “1-800 Contacts” as a keyword.  With 
respect to at least one competitor, Lens.com, 1-800 Contacts did not run any privacy 
reports to determine the keywords that had generated search results containing the 
links for the rival’s website.  Rather, it simply presumed that Lens.com had purchased 
“1-800 Contacts” as a keyword.2 
52. Indeed, in response to litigation threats, several competitors of 1-800 
Contacts advised 1-800 Contacts that: (i) they had never used 1-800 Contacts’ 
trademark in their advertisements, and/or (ii) the use of generic keywords would 
                                           2 Whether or not it is legal to use a competitor’s trade name as a search term (it 
likely is) is irrelevant.  The intent of the threatened legal action was to monopolize the 
industry and to get 1-800 Contacts’ competitors to agree to divvy up the market. 
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sometimes result in a search triggering a multitude of other contact lens sites, 
including legitimate sponsored advertisements.  Through its counsel, one competitor, 
Memorial Eye, specifically advised 1-800 Contacts that it had “‘never used, or even 
considered using, [1-800 Contacts’] trademark in its sponsored advertisements, or 
even a search phase trigger.’”  1-800 Contacts nevertheless continued with its threats, 
hoping to protect its market share and extract an anticompetitive agreement from its 
competitors by forcing them to incur substantial cost and/or limit the keywords they 
purchased from search engines. 
53. Competitors who refused to bow to 1-800 Contacts’ demands concerning 
a limitation on keywords or use of negative keywords were threatened with litigation.  
Most of these rivals lacked the size and resources to withstand substantial litigation.  
Between 2004 and 2013, 1-800 Contacts was able to extract at least 14 horizontal 
agreements that restrained trade and reduced output in the relevant markets. 
54. All of the agreements prohibit 1-800 Contacts’ competitors from bidding 
in a search advertising auction for 1-800 Contacts’ trademarked terms, as well as 
variations thereof.  All of the agreements are reciprocal, meaning that 1-800 Contacts 
is likewise prohibited from bidding in a search advertising auction for its competitors’ 
trademarked terms, as well as variations thereof.  This part of the agreement is market 
allocation, a naked horizontal restraint on trade and per se illegal under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  Additionally, 13 of the agreements require 1-800 Contacts’ competitors 
to use “negative keywords,” which direct a search engine not to display the 
competitor’s advertisement in response to a search query that includes 1-800 
Contacts’ trademarked names or variations thereof. 
55. One such competitor who entered into an agreement with 1-800 Contacts 
is VisionDirect.  VisionDirect sold contact lenses online at www.visiondirect.com.  It 
entered into two horizontal agreements with 1-800 Contacts. 
(a) The first agreement was entered into on June 24, 2005 (the “2005 
Agreement”).  Under the 2005 Agreement, VisionDirect was prohibited from 
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“‘causing [its] website or Internet advertisement to appear in response to any Internet 
search for [1-800 Contacts’] brand name, trademark or URL.’” The agreement also 
prohibited VisionDirect from “‘causing [its] brand name, or link to [its] Websites to 
appear as a listing in the search results page of an Internet search engine, when the 
user specifically searches for [1-800 Contacts’] brand name, trademark or URLs.’”  
On information and belief, VisionDirect, through its counsel, Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati, expressed serious antitrust concerns about the enforceability of 
the 2005 Agreement as it related to the implementation of negative keywords.  On 
January 24, 2008, Wilson Sonsini wrote 1-800 Contacts’ General Counsel: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) The second agreement was entered into in 2009 (the “2009 
Agreement”).  Under the 2009 Agreement, 1-800 Contacts and VisionDirect agreed to 
implement negative keyword lists in connection with their internet advertising efforts. 
There, too, VisionDirect expressed concern about the antitrust law problems 
associated with 1-800 Contacts’ agreement. VisionDirect expressed its concerns in the 
2009 Agreement, which provided: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56. This action by VisionDirect was against its economic interests.  In a 
competitive marketplace, VisionDirect would have continued to compete, in both 
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advertising and on price.  It could have covered its prices and increased its market 
share, taking from 1-800 Contacts.  Instead, it agreed not to compete.  This rationale 
applies to the remainder of the Doe Defendants.  No Doe Defendant was acting in its 
best economic interest, unless there was a conspiracy. 
57. Importantly, VisionDirect and the remainder of the Doe Defendants must 
have known that the other defendants were coming to the same agreement with 1-800 
Contacts.  This tacit agreement, in light of the other allegations in the complaint, 
including the continued market share of 1-800 Contacts, are enough to establish §1 
liability through a hub-and-spoke conspiracy with 1-800 Contacts at the center.  On 
information and belief, 1-800 Contacts assured VisionDirect and the other Doe 
Defendants that it was entering into agreements with all the participants in the direct-
to-consumer contact lens market.  This would ensure that each market participant was 
guaranteed to maintain its market share and, with no competing search results coming 
up when each company’s name was searched for, would enable VisionDirect and the 
co-conspirators to charge supracompetitive prices. 
58. Another factor making this conspiracy successful was how easy it was to 
ensure that no competitor was cheating on the conspiracy and violating the terms of 
their agreement.  All it would take to ensure that a competitor was abiding by the 
conspiracy was a simple internet search. 
59. 1-800 Contacts also sought to force many of its other competitors to 
implement measures similar to those agreed to by VisionDirect,3 including the 
following: 
(a) JSJ Enterprises: JSJ sold replacement contact lenses to consumers 
at www.contactlensconnection.com. 
(b) Premier Holdings: Premier Holdings sold replacement contact 
lenses to consumers at www.ezcontactusa.com and www.filmart.com.  After 1-800 
                                           3 On information and believe, these likely co-conspirators are the Doe Defendants. 
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Contacts initiated litigation, 1-800 Contacts and Premier Holdings entered into a string 
of eight stipulations to extend the deadline to answer in order for the parties to 
continue settlement discussions. 
(c) LensWorld: LensWorld sold replacement contact lenses to 
consumers at www.lensworld.com, www.contactmania.com and 
www.contactlensworld.com.  After extensive settlement discussions, LensWorld 
ultimately allowed the court to enter an order, through a default motion, which 
required LensWorld to “‘implement the negative keywords attached hereto as Exhibit 
A in any search engine advertising campaign performed for the benefit of 
[LensWorld], where possible, for so long as any one of [1-800 Contacts’] federally 
registered trademarks remain active.’” The list included 36 different search terms, 
including “www.contacts.com.” 
(d) Lensfast: Lensfast sold replacement contact lenses to consumers at 
www.lensfast.com, www.contactlens.com and www.e-contacts.com.  It also sold 
contacts over the telephone at 1-800 LENSFAST. 
(e) Lenses for Less: Lenses for Less sold replacement contact lenses to 
consumers at www.lensesforless.com. 
(f) Arlington Contact Lens Service: Arlington Contact Lens Service, 
which did business as Discount Contact Lenses, sold replacement contact lenses to 
consumers at www.discountcontactlenses.com and www.aclens.com. 
(g) Empire Vision Center: Empire Vision Center sold replacement 
contact lenses to consumers at www.lens123.com. 
(h) Contact Lens King: Contact Lens King sold replacement contact 
lenses to consumers at www.contactlensking.com. 
(i) Tram Data: Tram Data LLC sold replacement contact lenses to 
consumers at www.replacemycontacts.com. 
(j) Walgreen Company: Walgreen Company sold replacement contact 
lenses to consumers at www.walgreens.com. 
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(k) Standard Optical: Standard Optical sold replacement contact lenses 
to consumers at www.standardoptical.net. 
(l) Web Eye Care: Web Eye Care, Inc. sold replacement contact 
lenses to consumers at www.webeyecare.com. 
(m) Memorial Eye: Memorial Eye P.A. sold replacement contact lenses 
to consumers at www.shipmycontacts.com, www.ship-my-contacts.com and 
www.iwantcontacts.com.   
1-800 Contacts’ Lawsuit Against Lens.Com 
Is Dismissed for Lack of Merit 
60. 1-800 Contacts also sent cease-and-desist letters and ultimately filed a 
lawsuit against it rival, Lens.com.  As it had with many of its other rivals, 1-800 
Contacts sought an order preventing Lens.com “‘from using any variation of the 1-800 
CONTACTS Marks and any other marks or names that are confusingly similar,’” 
including “‘sponsored advertising triggers, other identifiers, keywords or other terms 
used to attract or divert traffic on the Internet or to secure higher placement within the 
search engine results.’”  Also, as it had with its other rivals, 1-800 Contacts based its 
lawsuit on the incorrect presumption that Lens.com had purchased “1-800 Contacts” 
as a keyword from search engines.  However, Lens.com fought the lawsuit. 
61. On December 14, 2010, the district court dismissed 1-800 Contacts’ 
lawsuit.  In a published 40-page decision, the court found that “[1-800 Contacts] has 
presented no evidence to show that [Lens.com] ever purchased [1-800 Contacts’] 
exact service mark as a keyword.”  1-800 Contacts, Inc., 755 F. Supp. at 1160.  More 
importantly, the court took aim at 1-800 Contacts’ practice of seeking agreements, 
through cease-and-desist letters, that precluded a competitor’s advertisements from 
appearing on a search-results page anytime its mark is entered as a search term.  It 
said that such a result would be “an anti-competitive, monopolistic protection to 
which it is not entitled”: 
As stated above, Plaintiff [1-800 Contacts] sends cease and desist 
letters anytime a competitor’s advertisement appears when Plaintiff’s 
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mark is entered as a search term.  Were Plaintiff actually able to preclude 
competitor advertisements from appearing on a search-results page 
anytime its mark is entered as a search term, it would result in an anti-
competitive, monopolistic protection, to which it is not entitled. 
Id. at 1174. 
62. The district court’s skepticism about such agreements continued, as it 
questioned whether any such contract between 1-800 Contacts and Lens.com would 
survive an antitrust challenge.  According to the order:  
Were this actually an agreement entered into by the parties, the 
court questions whether it would survive an antitrust challenge. [1-800 
Contacts] does not seek merely to preclude usage of its trademark. 
Instead, it wants to obliterate any other competitor advertisement from 
appearing on a search-results page when a consumer types in 
“1800Contacts” as a search term or some variation of it. This is 
disturbing given that broad matching of the generic term “contacts” 
could trigger an advertisement if a consumer enters the search term 
“1800Contacts.” A trademark right does not grant its owner the right to 
stamp out every competitor advertisement. 
Id. at 1188 (emphasis in original). 
63. On July 16, 2013, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary 
judgment on all of 1-800 Contacts’ claims based on keyword use that did not result in 
ads displaying 1-800 Contacts’ mark in their text.   
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE AGREEMENTS  
64. Defendants’ conduct harmed plaintiffs and the Class and California 
Subclass by depriving them of a marketplace in which consumers of contact lenses 
make their decisions about the purchase of contact lenses free from the influence of 
defendants’ bilateral agreements, which restrain truthful advertising by competitors 
responsible for the vast majority of direct-to-consumer sales of contact lenses. 
65. Defendants’ price-fixing conspiracy had the following anticompetitive 
effects, among others: (a) price competition has been restrained or eliminated with 
respect to contacts lenses sold directly to consumers, including online, in the United 
States and California; (b) the price of contact lenses sold directly to consumers, 
including online, in the United States and California has been fixed, raised, 
maintained, or stabilized at artificially inflated levels; and (c) purchasers of contact 
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lenses sold directly to consumers, including online, in the United States and California 
have been deprived of free and open competition. During the Class Period, plaintiffs 
and the members of the Class and the California Subclass paid supracompetitive 
prices for contact lenses sold directly to consumers, including online, in the United 
States and California. 
66. Plaintiffs have suffered significant injury as a result of defendants’ 
contact lens price manipulation conspiracy.  Typically, when consumers conduct web 
searches for contact lenses, they are presented with options from a range of contact 
lens sellers.  Any sellers who were offering the same contact lenses at prices higher 
than their competitors would either (i) retain higher prices and risk losing business to 
rivals or (ii) lower prices to bring their prices in line with their competitors’ prices and 
compete for the business.  Falling prices would, in turn, stimulate additional 
competition among various contact lens sellers.  However, through agreements that 
rigged search results in response to online user queries, defendants ensured that 
consumers were presented with only one option – the option to pay whatever 
defendants wanted to charge in a competition-free market – as long as it was not 
enough to drive them to run another search.  But for defendants’ anticompetitive 
conduct, consumers such as plaintiffs would have been aware of and presented with 
options from various sellers of contact lenses, and would have purchase lenses from 
the seller featuring the lowest price. 
67. By reason of the alleged violations of federal and California laws, 
plaintiffs and the members of the Class and California Subclass have sustained injury 
to their business or property in the form of the overcharges they paid for contact 
lenses sold directly to consumers, including online, in the United States and 
California.  Plaintiffs and the Class paid more for contact lenses than they would have 
in the absence of defendants’ illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy, and, as a 
result, have suffered damages in an amount presently undetermined. This is an 
antitrust injury of the type that the antitrust laws were meant to punish and prevent. 
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68. In formulating and effectuating the contract, combination or conspiracy, 
defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in anticompetitive activities, the purpose 
and effect of which was to fix, maintain, suppress, inflate and otherwise make 
artificial the price of contact lenses sold directly to consumers, including online, in the 
United States and to California residents. 
69. Plaintiffs suffered antitrust injury in that they paid more for contact 
lenses purchased from defendants than they would have paid had the manipulation not 
occurred. 
70. Injury to plaintiffs and the Class and the California Subclass also resulted 
from defendants’ deprivation of the benefits of free and open competition in the 
market for online contact lens sales. 
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
71. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2) 
and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all Class members, 
defined as: All persons that made at least one retail purchase of contact lenses from 
defendants from January 1, 2004 through the present (“Class Period”).  Excluded from 
the Class are defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-
conspirators, governmental entities and instrumentalities of government, states and 
their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. 
72. Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of the California Subclass, 
which is defined as: all members of the Class that reside in California that made at 
least one retail purchase of contact lenses from defendants from January 1, 2004 
through the present. 
73. The Class and California Subclass are ascertainable and are ones for 
which records should readily exist. 
74. Members of each class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable.  
Plaintiffs do not know the exact size of the Class and Subclass, but because of the 
nature of the trade and commerce involved, plaintiffs believe that there are tens, if not 
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hundreds, of thousands of Class members as described above, the exact number and 
identities being known to defendants and their co-conspirators.  Moreover, the 
members of the Class are dispersed across the United States. 
75. There is a well-defined community of interest among plaintiffs and the 
members of the Class and California Subclass.  Because defendants have acted in a 
manner generally applicable to the Class and California Subclass, questions of law 
and fact common to members of the Class and California Subclass predominate over 
questions, if any, that may affect only individual members of the Class and California 
Subclass.  Such generally applicable conduct is inherent in defendants’ wrongful and 
anticompetitive conduct. 
76. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:  
(a) whether defendants and their co-conspirators entered into an 
agreement, combination or conspiracy to rig the bidding in search engine advertising 
auctions, increase or maintain supracompetitive prices for contact lenses, allocate the 
market for online contact lens sales, and/or prevent the dissemination of information 
concerning competitors’ pricing of contact lenses; 
(b) the identity of the participants of the alleged conspiracy; 
(c) the duration of the conspiracy alleged herein and the acts 
performed by defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy; 
(d) whether, pursuant to bidding agreements, defendants agreed to 
restrict bidding in search advertising auctions; 
(e) whether the bidding agreements were necessary to yield a 
procompetitive benefit that is cognizable and non-pretextual; 
(f) whether such agreements are per se unlawful because they restrict 
competition; 
(g) whether such agreements are unlawful under the rule of reason; 
(h) whether 1-800 Contacts possessed market power or monopoly 
power over direct-to-consumer and online sales of contact lenses; 
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(i) whether the law requires definition of a relevant market when 
direct proof of market power or monopoly power is available and, if so, the definition 
of the relevant market(s); 
(j) whether defendants’ conduct affected interstate and intrastate 
commerce; 
(k) whether the conduct of defendants and their co-conspirators, as 
alleged in this complaint, caused injury to plaintiffs and the other members of the 
Class; 
(l) whether the effects of defendants’ alleged conspiracy were 
anticompetitive in nature; and 
(m) the appropriate nature of class-wide injunctive or other equitable 
relief. 
77. Among the questions of law and fact common to the California Subclass 
are: 
(a) whether the alleged conspiracy violated the Cartwright Act; 
(b) whether the alleged conspiracy violated the UCL; 
(c) whether the conduct of defendants and their co-conspirators, as 
alleged in this complaint, caused injury to the plaintiffs and the other members of the 
California Subclass; 
(d) the effect of defendants’ alleged conspiracy on the prices of 
contact lenses sold directly to consumers, including online, to California residents 
during the Class Period; 
(e) the appropriate class-wide measure of damages; and 
(f) the appropriate nature of class-wide injunctive or other equitable 
relief. 
78. There are no defenses of a unique nature that may be asserted against 
plaintiffs individually, as distinguished from the other members of the Class, and the 
relief sought is common to the Class. 
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79. There are no defenses of a unique nature that may be asserted against 
plaintiffs individually, as distinguished from the other members of the California 
Subclass, and the relief sought is common to the California Subclass. 
80. Plaintiffs are members of the Class and their claims are typical of the 
claims of the other members of the Class.  Plaintiffs were damaged by the same 
wrongful conduct of defendants. 
81. Plaintiffs are members of the California Subclass and their claims are 
typical of the claims of the other members of the California Subclass.  Plaintiffs were 
damaged by the same wrongful conduct of defendants. 
82. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of other Class 
and California Subclass members because they have no interests antagonistic to, or 
that conflict with, those of any other Class or California Subclass member.  Plaintiffs 
are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and have retained competent 
counsel, experienced in litigation of this nature, to represent them and the other 
members of the Class and California Subclass. 
83. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of this controversy.  Class treatment will enable a large number of 
similarly situated parties to prosecute their claims in a single forum simultaneously, 
efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort and expense 
that would result if individual actions were pursued. 
84. This case is also manageable as a class action.  Plaintiffs know of no 
difficulty to be encountered in the prosecution of this action that would preclude its 
maintenance as a class action.  In any event, the benefits of proceeding as a class 
action, including providing injured persons or entities with a method for obtaining 
redress for claims that could not practicably be pursued individually, substantially 
outweigh potential difficulties in the management of this action as a class action. 
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85. Defendants’ unlawful acts alleged in this complaint had a substantial 
effect on commerce and caused antitrust injury to plaintiffs and the Class and the 
California Subclass. 
86. Defendants’ unlawful acts had the purpose and effect of manipulating the 
price of contact lenses sold directly to consumers, including over the internet, in the 
United States and to California residents. 
87. As a direct result of defendants’ violations, plaintiffs and the members of 
the Class and California Subclass have been damaged. 
88. As a direct and foreseeable result of defendants’ unlawful anticompetitive 
acts, the prices of contact lenses sold directly to consumers, including online, in the 
United States and to California residents was manipulated and inflated. 
89. In addition, as a direct and foreseeable result of defendants’ unlawful 
anticompetitive acts, plaintiffs, the Class and the California Subclass were deprived of 
the ability to receive truthful and non-misleading advertising. 
INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE COMMERCE 
90. At all relevant times, 1-800 Contacts and its co-conspirators promoted, 
distributed and sold substantial amounts of contact lenses in a continuous and 
uninterrupted flow of commerce across state and national lines throughout the United 
States. 
91. Defendants transmitted and received funds, as well as contracts, invoices 
and other forms of business communications and transactions, in a continuous and 
uninterrupted flow of commerce across state and national lines throughout the United 
States. 
92. In furtherance of their efforts to monopolize and restrain competition, 
defendants employed the United States mails and interstate telephone lines, as well as 
interstate travel.  Defendants’ activities were within the flow of, and have substantially 
affected (and will continue to substantially affect), interstate commerce. 
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93. Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct also had substantial intrastate 
effects in that price competition in California has been restrained or eliminated with 
respect to contact lenses sold directly to consumers and online, the price of contact 
lenses sold directly to consumers and online in California has been fixed, raised, 
maintained or stabilized at artificially inflated levels, and purchasers of contact lenses 
sold directly to consumers and online in California have been deprived of free and 
open competition.  The agreements to restrict bidding in search advertising auctions 
for the online sale of contact lenses directly impacted and disrupted commerce within 
California. 
94. During the Class Period, contact lenses sold by defendants were shipped 
into California and were sold to or paid for by plaintiffs and Class members in 
California. 
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE TIMELY 
95. Plaintiffs bring their claims within the applicable statute of limitations. 
96. Defendants concealed their anti-competitive activities by, among other 
things, engaging in secret communications in furtherance of the conspiracy.  
Defendants agreed among themselves not to discuss publicly or otherwise reveal the 
nature and substance of their agreements alleged herein. 
97. None of the facts or information available to plaintiffs, if investigated 
with reasonable diligence, could or would have led to the discovery of the conduct 
alleged in this complaint.  Plaintiffs and the Class were led to believe that the prices 
offered to them were the product of legitimate market conditions rather than 
defendants’ manipulative collusive activities. 
98. As a result, plaintiffs were prevented from learning of the facts needed to 
commence suit against defendants until no earlier than August 8, 2016, when the FTC 
filed a complaint against 1-800 Contacts.  There are many other reasons why these 
facts could not have been known, including that: (i) defendants’ advertising strategies 
are not public information; (ii) search engines do not publish information concerning 
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particular search terms and search algorithms; and (iii) the horizontal agreements 
restricting trade were not disclosed publicly. 
99. Because of defendants’ active steps, including the fraudulent 
concealment of their conspiracy to prevent plaintiffs from discovering and suing them 
for the anti-competitive activities alleged in this complaint, defendants are equitably 
estopped from asserting that any otherwise applicable limitations period has run, or 
that the statute of limitations began running before August 8, 2016. 
MONOPOLY POWER 
100. At all relevant times, 1-800 Contacts had market power because it had the 
power to maintain the price of contact lenses sold directly to consumers and online 
without losing so many sales as to make the supracompetitive price unprofitable.  
Indeed, to this day, 1-800 Contacts’ prices for contact lenses are consistently up to 
40% higher than the prices charged by others in the direct-to-consumer and online 
markets. 
101. At all relevant times, 1-800 Contacts operated in the relevant markets.  1-
800 Contacts sold contact lenses directly to consumers and online at prices well in 
excess of its marginal costs and the competitive price for contact lenses, and enjoyed 
the resulting high profit margins and correspondence financial benefits – to the 
financial detriment of plaintiffs and Class members. 
102. 1-800 Contacts, at all relevant times, had enjoyed high barriers to entry 
with respect to competition in the relevant product market due to regulatory 
protections.  The FTC has studied the various barriers to entry in the contact lens 
market.  Such barriers to entry include: 
(a) New entrants must acquire and possess a substantial amount of 
inventory of contact lenses from various manufacturers to attract consumers and meet 
their needs with prompt delivery. 
(b) Before entering the market, new entrants must invest an enormous 
amount of money and other resources into their businesses.  For example, new 
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entrants must recruit, hire and train personnel and lease or buy real estate.  New 
entrants must invest in the significant information and systems infrastructure 
necessary to support online commerce.  New entrants must also create and then invest 
in the significant promotional activities necessary to attract customers to their online 
sales website. 
(c) New entrants must overcome established, dominant sellers such as 
1-800 Contacts, VisionDirect and the Doe Defendants, and established buyer 
preferences.  As alleged herein, 1-800 Contacts has dominated the market for direct-
to-consumer and online sales of contact lenses for many years. 
(d) 1-800 Contacts’ practices also serve to deter potential new 
competitors from entering the direct-to-consumer and online markets for the sale of 
contact lenses. 
(e) New entrants must establish and maintain relationships with 
contact lens manufacturers and consumers.  New entrants must negotiate and acquire 
distribution rights from contact lens manufacturers to sell their products online.  
Establishing and maintaining relationships with manufacturers is costly and time-
consuming.  New entrants must also attract enough customers to cover their 
substantial operating expenses. 
1-800 CONTACTS’ UNILATERAL ARBITRATION 
PROVISION IS NOT BINDING AND UNENFORCEABLE 
103. 1-800 Contacts’ website has a “Terms of Service” page.  The terms of 
service page claims that “Any dispute relating in any way to your visit to this website 
or to products you purchase through us shall be submitted to confidential arbitration in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, except that, to the extent you have in any manner violated or 
threatened to violate our intellectual property rights, we may seek injunctive or other 
appropriate relief in any state or federal court in the state of Utah, and you consent to 
exclusive jurisdiction and venue in such courts.” 
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104. This paragraph about arbitration, however, is not binding on plaintiffs, 
the Class or the California Subclass.  Any agreement to arbitrate is not specifically 
highlighted.  In fact, there are no direct links to the “Terms of Service” page on 1-800 
Contacts homepage.  The only way to find the Terms of Service page is to click on the 
“Common Questions (FAQ)” link on the 1-800 Contacts’ homepage, which itself is in 
extremely small print and is likely to be overlooked, as shown in Exhibit A. 
105. After clicking on the Common Questions link, there is still no immediate 
mention of arbitration.  Instead, the last link on the Common Questions page, which 
has to be scrolled down to see in most browsers, is a link entitled “Terms of Service,” 
as shown in Exhibit A. 
106. After clicking on the Terms of Service link, a consumer can finally 
access the Terms of Service page, which contains the mention of arbitration.  Even in 
the unlikely event that a consumer did find and review the Terms of Service page 
before ordering contact lenses through 1-800 Contacts’ website, the arbitration 
language is only viewable if a user scrolls down to a section titled “Disputes,” as 
shown in Exhibit A. 
107. In addition, there is no place for a consumer to acknowledge receipt of 
the arbitration provision or for a consumer to acknowledge that it understood that it 
was governed by the arbitration provision.  In fact, there is no requirement that a 
1-800 Contacts customer even see the arbitration provision before ordering contacts 
through 1-800 Contacts’ website, let alone take action to expressly consent to the 
arbitration provision.  Accordingly, there was never any meeting of the minds, as 
required by law, regarding the arbitration of disputes and any reasonable user of 1-800 
Contacts’ website would be surprised by the existence of the arbitration provision. 
108. 1-800 Contacts retained the full right to unilaterally modify the terms of 
the arbitration agreement, as shown by its carve out of intellectual property disputes. 
109. Accordingly, 1-800 Contacts’ arbitration provision is unconscionable, 
contrary to public policy and unenforceable. 
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COUNT I 
For Violations of §§1 and 3 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Against All Defendants 
(On Behalf of the Class) 
110. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding allegations. 
111. Defendants, and their co-conspirators, entered into and engaged in a 
conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of §§1 and 3 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 3.  The conspiracy consisted of a continuing 
agreement, understanding, or concerted action between and among defendants and 
their co-conspirators in furtherance of which defendants artificially fixed, raised,  
maintained and/or stabilized the prices for contact lenses sold directly-to-consumers, 
including online, throughout the United States. 
112. Defendants’ unlawful conduct was through mutual understandings, 
combinations or agreements by, between and among 1-800 Contacts, VisionDirect and 
the other Doe Defendants.  Defendants’ conspiracy is a per se violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act and is, in any event, an unreasonable and unlawful restraint of 
trade. 
113. There is no legitimate business justification for, or procompetitive benefit 
caused by, defendants’ unreasonable restraint of trade.  Any ostensible procompetitive 
benefit was pretextual or could have been achieved by less restrictive means. 
114. Defendants’ conspiracy, and the resulting impact on the prices of contact 
lenses, and the information provided to consumers, occurred in and affected interstate 
commerce and commerce in and between the territories of the United States. 
115. As a direct, intended, foreseeable, and proximate result of defendants’ 
conspiracy and overt acts taken in furtherance therefore, plaintiffs and each member 
of the Class have suffered injury.  Plaintiffs’ and each Class member’s damages are 
directly attributable to defendants’ conduct, which resulted in all Class members 
paying more for contact lenses than they would have otherwise paid, but for 
defendants’ agreements. 
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116. Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s injuries are the type the antitrust laws were 
designed to prevent and flow from that which makes defendants’ conduct unlawful.  
Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to treble damages, attorneys’ fees, reasonable 
expenses, and cost of suit for the violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
COUNT II 
For Violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Against 1-800 Contacts 
(On Behalf of the Class) 
117. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding allegations. 
118. At all relevant times, 1-800 Contacts possessed substantial monopoly and 
market power with respect to direct-to-consumer and online sales of contact lenses.  1-
800 Contacts possessed the power to control prices, and prevent prices from falling, in 
direct-to-consumer sales of contact lenses, including in online sales. 
119. In violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 1-800 Contacts 
monopolized, attempted to monopolize and conspired or agreed to monopolize the 
direct-to-consumer and online markets for contact lenses.  As previously alleged, 
beginning in 2004 and continuing thereafter, 1-800 Contacts abused its monopoly 
power to inflate the price of contact lenses sold directly to consumers, among other 
ways, by (i) sending a series of cease-and-desist letters that included baseless 
representations regarding competitors’ supposed purchases and uses of 1-800 
Contacts’ service mark as a keyword for online searches, (ii) seeking agreements that 
far exceed the scope of 1-800 Contacts’ trademark rights, (iii) filing objectively and 
subjectively baseless litigation against competitors for the purpose of interfering with 
their ability to compete in the online market for contact lenses, and (iv) entering into 
anticompetitive agreements with its competitors that prevented direct-to-consumer and 
online sellers of contact lenses from competing against each other, and with 1-800 
Contacts. 
120. 1-800 Contacts did not obtain or maintain its monopoly power by reason 
of a superior product, business acumen or historic accident. 
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121. 1-800 Contacts’ scheme harmed competition as detailed above. 
122. As a direct and proximate result of 1-800 Contacts’ illegal and 
monopolistic conduct, as alleged herein, plaintiffs and the Class were injured.   
COUNT III 
For Violations of the Cartwright Act 
Against All Defendants 
(On Behalf of the California Subclass) 
123. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding allegations. 
124. The acts and practices detailed above violate the Cartwright Act, Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code §16700, et seq. 
125. It is appropriate to bring this action under the Cartwright Act because 
many of the purchasers reside in California and because other overt acts in furtherance 
of the conspiracy and overcharges flowing from those acts occurred in California. 
126. As detailed above, the anticompetitive conduct described herein 
constitutes a per se violation of California’s antitrust laws and is an unreasonable and 
unlawful restraint of trade.  The anticompetitive effects of defendants’ conduct far 
outweigh any purported non-pretextual, pro-competitive justification. 
127. As a proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, plaintiffs and the 
members of the California Subclass they seek to represent have been injured in their 
business or property in violation of the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§16700, et seq., by paying supracompetitive prices for contact lenses bought over the 
internet during the Class Period. Such overcharges are the type of injury the antitrust 
laws were designed to prevent and flow directly from defendants’ unlawful conduct.  
Plaintiffs and members of the California Subclass are proper entities to bring a case 
concerning this conduct. 
128. Plaintiffs and members of the California Subclass have standing to and 
hereby seek monetary relief, including treble damages, together with other relief, as 
well as attorneys’ fees and costs, as redress for defendants’ Cartwright Act violations. 
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COUNT IV 
For Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law 
Against All Defendants 
(On Behalf of the California Subclass) 
129. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding allegations. 
130. Plaintiffs bring this claim under §§17203 and 17204 of the Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code to enjoin, and obtain restitution and disgorgement of all monetary gains 
that resulted from, acts that violated §17200, et seq., of the Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, 
commonly known as the UCL. 
131. Plaintiffs and the members of the California Subclass have standing to 
bring this action under the UCL because they have been harmed and have suffered 
injury by being forced to pay inflated, supracompetitive prices for contact lenses sold 
directly to California residents during the Class Period. 
132. In formulating and carrying out the alleged agreement, understanding and 
conspiracy, defendants and their co-conspirators did those things that they combined 
and conspired to do, including but not limited to, the acts, practices and course of 
conduct set forth herein, and these acts constitute unfair competition in violation of the 
UCL. 
133. Defendants’ conspiracy had the following effects, among others: (i) price 
competition in the market for contact lenses sold directly to California residents, 
including online, during the Class Period was restrained, suppressed and/or 
eliminated; (ii) prices for contact lenses sold to California residents during the Class 
Period by defendants and their co-conspirators have been fixed, raised, maintained 
and stabilized at artificially high, non-competitive levels; and (iii) plaintiffs and 
members of the California Subclass who purchased contact lenses in California during 
the Class Period directly from defendants have been deprived of the benefits of free 
and open competition. 
134. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ anticompetitive conduct, 
plaintiffs and members of the California Subclass have been injured in their business 
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or property by paying more for contact lenses sold directly to California residents and 
purchased directly from defendants during the Class Period than they would have paid 
absent of the conspiracy. 
135. The anticompetitive behavior, as described above, is unfair, 
unconscionable, unlawful and fraudulent, and in any event it is a violation of the 
policy or spirit of the UCL. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court: 
A. Determine that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), and direct that reasonable notice of this 
action, as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), be given to the Class and California 
Subclass, and declare plaintiffs representative of the Class and California Subclass; 
B. Enter a judgment awarding plaintiffs and the Class and California 
Subclass damages against defendants as a result of defendants’ unlawful conduct 
alleged in this complaint, plus treble damages and all other available damages, 
including any statutory or liquidated damages or otherwise; 
C. Award to plaintiffs and the Class and California Subclass their costs of 
suit, including reasonable attorneys’ and experts’ fees and expenses; 
D. Order that defendants, their directors, officers, employees, agents, 
successors, members, and all persons in active concert and participation with them be 
enjoined and restrained from, in any manner, directly or indirectly, committing any 
additional violations of the law as alleged herein; and 
E. Award any other and further relief as the Court may deem just and 
proper. 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs respectfully demand a trial by jury on all issues that can be tried to a 
jury. 
DATED:  October 13, 2016 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
 & DOWD LLP 
PATRICK J. COUGHLIN 
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